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The public sphere and Muslim identities
W          policy makers acknowledged a new sense of public
in the Muslim-majority and Arab worlds even before the September ,
 terrorist attacks. For them, it is called the ‘Arab street’,
a new phenomenon of public accountability, which we have seldom had to factor into
our projections of Arab behavior in the past. The information revolution, and par-
ticularly the daily dose of uncensored television coming out of local TV stations like
al-Jazira and international coverage by CNN and others, is shaping public opinion,
which, in turn, is pushing Arab governments to respond. We don’t know, and the
leaders themselves don’t know, how that pressure will impact on Arab policy in the
future (Walker ; see also Tenet ).
The use of the term ‘street’, rather than ‘public sphere’ or ‘public’,
imputes passivity or a propensity to easy manipulation and implies a lack
of formal or informal leadership. Nonetheless, this use of ‘street’ shows
how policy makers now acknowledge that authoritarian and single-party
states also have ‘publics’ that they must take into account.
Political ‘belonging’ in precolonial Morocco
The idea of the ‘street’ or the ‘public sphere’ is not recent for the
Arab or the Muslim-majority world. Consider, for example, the oath of
allegiance (bay‘a) to the ruler in precolonial Morocco. Political ‘belong-
ing’ was not based on unquestioned belief, but on a continuing process
of contest and reaffirmation. Since at least the fifteenth century,
Moroccan monarchs circulated almost continuously throughout their
domains. In royal progresses (harkas) with their entourage, they embod-
An earlier version of this paper was present-
ed at the European-American Young Scholars’
Summer Institute, ‘Public Spheres and Mus-
lim Societies’, held July  in Berlin and
funded by the Alexander von Humboldt
Foundation. The authors wish to thank its
participants for their comments and sugges-
tions.

Dale F. E, Dartmouth College (Hanover, NH).
Armando S, Humboldt University (Berlin).
Arch. europ. sociol., XLIII, (),-—-//-$.per art + $.per page ©A.E.S.
ied their personal authority in constantly shifting locales, including the
four imperial cities of Fez, Marrakesh, Meknes and Rabat (Geertz :
-).
The legal and popular dimensions of the bay‘a shed light on the
nature of Morocco’s precolonial public. Bettina Dennerlein (: -
), for example, discusses the October  oath of allegiance in Fez
to Sultan Mawlay al-Hasan. The artisans of Fez insisted on making the
bay‘a contingent on the abolition of certain non-Islamic taxes. The men
of learning (‘ulama) and others who drew up the bay‘a (notables and
military leaders) agreed to this provision, although a few days later
‘certain people’ nonetheless prepared to reinstate the tax. Learning of
this development, the tanners of Fez and their followers attacked and
plundered the residence of the tax administrator, who took refuge with
his family in the shrine of Mawlay Idris, the patron saint of Fez.
A month later, Mawlay al-Hasan announced an amnesty for those
involved. When the sultan himself arrived in Fez in April , how-
ever, he ordered the non-Islamic taxes restored. Again conflict erupted.
This time the royal army besieged the rebellious quarters, killing and
pillaging until the inhabitants again accepted the same taxes as had been
levied under the ruler’s father and predecessor, Mawlay Muhammad ibn
‘Abdarrahman.
The bay‘a documents that Dennerlein analyzes indicate the contin-
gent nature of collective identities. Kinship, social status, locality and
occupation were all ‘possible organizing principles for the construction
of political belonging’. An important element in achieving notable status
was the ability—whether as judge, military leader, descendant of the
Prophet (sharif), head of a guild of merchants or artisans, or tribal
leader—to secure loyalty and obedience to the ruler. Bay‘a documents
were read aloud in public in every town in which they were prepared,
generally in mosques. Some represented collectivities, others prominent
notables, and the texts of various bay‘as were circulated throughout the
monarchy.
The specifics of these texts varied, but the standard components
included elements affirming the ruler’s legitimacy and at least implicitly
limiting him to rule according to the precepts of Islamic law and ‘gener-
ally accepted standards of how a ruler should act’ (Dennerlein :
). A second element venerated the descendants of the Prophet
Muhammad, the shurafa. As Dennerlein concludes, the bay‘a ‘obviously
did not represent a contract freely agreed upon between equal parties
and creating mutually binding, immediately obtainable rights and obli-
gations’. Neither, however, did it merely justify autocratic rule by the
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sultan. Its significance ‘lay in its contribution to sustaining and acting
out a sense of political belonging’. Recognition of the ruler was ‘rather
the result of a combination of different forms and different levels of
empirical involvement of individual and collective actors with a par-
ticular discourse on political ruler in Islam’. Religious discourse was
rarely used to delegitimize a particular ruler, but it ‘nevertheless created
a certain space for debate’. It also indicates that the various social actors
were ‘actively’ involved in sustaining the sense of political community
(Dennerlein : ).
The practical workings of the precolonial bay‘a in Morocco point to
the existence of a pre-modern public sphere, offering a wide-ranging
flow of discursive social action. In this public sphere, members of the
social body monitored one another and acted through a combination of
at least partial consensus and a shared hierarchy of leaders of influence.
There were some formalized institutional arrangements, such as pious
endowments (awqaf), but informal and pervasive patterns of influence,
responsibility, and shared expectations were equally important. These
arrangements offered a framework for discourse and practice that
extended beyond households, villages and immediate localities, facilitat-
ing discussions of the common good and of shifting, continually
contested, boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.
The public sphere is thus not limited to ‘modern’ societies. It is the
site where contests take place over the definition of the ‘common good’,
and also of the virtues, obligations and rights that members of society
require for the common good to be realized. This emergent sense of
public goes hand-in-hand with the sharing of norms that define ideas of
community and the responsibilities of those who belong to it. The idea
of the public sphere is thus a wider notion than that of civil society. As
Kamali (: ) observes, ‘Although there is no consensus about the
definition of civil society, there are some factors, such as individualism
and democratic institutions, that are taken for granted as necessary
conditions’. But he also notes that individualism and democratic insti-
tutions are not necessary for a civil society to exist. One of the precon-
ditions for civil society, however, is the ‘existence of a relatively inde-
pendent public sphere’ in which debate takes place that ‘influences’
political decision-making. It is useful to recall the argument put forward
by Richard Tapper () over a decade ago, that ‘tribal’ regions of the
Middle East, rather than being regions of necessary disorder and anar-
chy, often offered more opportunities for peace and a ‘just’ social order
than those available through submission to state authorities. In this
sense, tribal orders have sometimes offered the prospects of civil society
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in the sense of the emergence of institutions autonomous from the state
that facilitate orderly economic, social and political activity and that
imply a moral order largely distinct from state or royal authority. The
more common, narrow usage of civil society, especially since the early
s, has been the promotion of non-governmental organizations,
human rights, and honest elections. This narrower sense of civil society
is an important one, but again presupposes the existence of a ‘relatively
independent public sphere’.
In claiming that the bay‘a in precolonial Morocco suggests the exist-
ence of a public sphere, we encounter a limitation that is still at the core
of much current social theory. In spite of the fact that several historical
and anthropological works on Africa and Asia have shown the elements
of transaction and legitimacy present in clan, lineage and tribally-based
collectivities, social theory still foregrounds developments in Europe to
the detriment of other world regions (see Chakrabarti : -). In the
introduction to his sociology of religion, Max Weber (: ) stated
that his interest was to explain the combination of factors that resulted
in European uniqueness. Later scholars were less cautious. They used
European institutions as the comparative basis against which to measure
social and cultural institutions elsewhere.
Even if not intending to create a yardstick for interregional com-
parison, Jürgen Habermas, whose name is closely associated with the
idea of the public sphere, sees as its essential element the historical
emergence in Europe of ‘rational-critical’ discourse among the ‘reason-
ing public’ of eighteenth century bourgeois society (Calhoun : ).
The vast international echoes that Habermas’ argument gained after the
translation of his book into English and the fall of the Soviet Union have
made his argument on the public sphere an equally powerful token of
Eurocentrism in social theory.
The public sphere: beyond Europe and before modernity
At its base, Habermas’ idea of the public sphere implies a space
separate from the formal structure of political authority and the space of
households, kin, and, later, the European ‘nuclear’ family. Habermas
defines the public sphere as ‘a realm of our social life in which something
approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all
citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every
conversation in which private citizens assemble to form a public body’
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(Habermas  [orig. ]: -). In a notion that can be traced
back to Immanuel Kant (-), the public sphere for Habermas is
ideally an intermediate space in which ideas are presented on their own
merits rather than as emanating from such authorities as preachers,
judges and rulers. Authority is vested in the public sphere itself. In it, all
participants have in principle an equal opportunity to persuade others.
Even for early modern Europe, however, the early Habermas
neglected the role of religion in the development and expansion of the
public sphere. For example, he ignored the movements of pietism and
religious revivalism that were so successful in different parts of Ger-
many, including Prussia, as well as in Scandinavia and other Protestant
majority parts of Western Europe. These movements instituted a sense
of legitimacy through congregational forms of deliberation, as opposed
to the dominant state-bound Lutheran churches. In later writings,
Habermas acknowledged that the process through which norms are
produced, which reflect general interest and create an ‘overlapping
consensus’ in society, can only be rooted in tradition, familiarity and
culture, through which individuals internalize the procedures of
consensus. This also applies to ‘those who do not belong to the lucky
heritage of Jefferson’. The communicative presuppositions for generat-
ing such a consensus are not the privilege of a particular culture
(Habermas : -).
In emphasizing the ‘rationality potential’ of communicative action
rooted in the ‘life world’ as the generating source for shared notions of
justice, Habermas (: -) in his more recent writings has made a
major contribution in showing that there is no inherent reason why the
notion of public sphere has to be restricted to an idealized European
bourgeoisie. Building on the later Habermas in discussing the eight-
eenth century and later periods, Casanova (: ) reminds us of the
‘public and political posture of free, congregational, ‘‘leveling’’, non-
conformist sects or of any disestablished religion ready to clash with an
unjust and sinful state’.
Although the complex relationship of the Enlightenment to move-
ments of religious renewal was known to European thinkers before
Habermas, and has been increasingly evidenced by historians after the
translation of Habermas’ main work into English (Salvatore : ),
prevailing theories of modernity and modernization in the mid-
twentieth century assumed that religious movements, identities and
practices had become increasingly marginal to modern societies. These
conventional assumptions have also until recently blocked the search for
distinctive public spheres in ‘traditional’ societies in general and ‘Mus-
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lim’ societies in particular. Ernest Gellner (: ), for example,
regarded Islam as imposing ‘essential’ constraints on the conduct and
thought of those committed to it. Similarly, consolidated frames of
interpretation of the evolution of the Ottoman Empire discouraged
consideration of continuities between the religiously legitimated empire
and the ensuing secular republic. New approaches to social, political and
economic history point instead to how the Ottoman Empire initiat-
ed many of the underlying developments of modern Turkish society,
including changing notions of belonging, land and territory. Modernity
as a process antedated the republican era (Meeker ; Duben and
Behar ).
Discerning the public
In The Public and Its Problems (), John Dewey (-)
argues that in no two ages or places does the same idea of the public
exist. By ‘public’, Dewey means an institution with recognized common
goals and at least an informal leadership, so his notion coincides with
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere. Dewey (: ) writes ‘What
the public may be, what the officials are, and how adequately they per-
form their functions, are things we have to go to history to discover’.
When acting in the public interest, people behave neither like business
or professional people transacting private affairs, nor like members of a
constitutional order subject to the legal constraints. The state is part of
this public insofar as it is seen as legitimately representing the interests
of the community. The public is ‘organized and made effective by means
of representatives who as guardians of custom, as legislators, as execu-
tives, judges, etc., care for its especial interests by methods intended to
regulate the conjoint actions of individuals and groups. Then and in so
far, association adds to itself political organization’ (Dewey : ).
Dewey reaffirms the necessary role of intermediary institutions and
authorities, as against the emphasis that Kant and Habermas place on
the public sphere occupying a social space freed from the influence of
such authorities.
Dewey’s approach also offers an alternative to treating history in
monolithic ‘chunks’ such as ‘Pre-Axial/Agrarian’, ‘Axial’, and ‘Modern’,
categories that inadvertently deflect attention away from how societies
change. Political forms for Dewey develop incrementally through ‘the
outcome of a vast series of adaptations and responsive accommodations,
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each to its own particular situation’ (Dewey : ). Dewey also cau-
tioned against the idea of technology itself structuring culture. The
invention of the printing press, for example, did not inevitably lead to
democracy (Dewey : ). Yet at the same time, inventions such as
the electric light bulb contributed vastly to restructuring the use of space
and time, just as television has been crucial in constructing the leisure
time of privatized and passive late twentieth century consumers. For
Dewey, writing in the aftermath of World War I, the great transforma-
tion was the ‘machine age’, which had ‘so enormously expanded, multi-
plied, intensified and complicated the scope of the indirect consequen-
ces’ of vast, impersonal economic and political actions. The result is too
many ‘inchoate, conflicting, and uninformed’ publics, whose common
interests are difficult to discern and construct (Dewey : , ).
If a sense of public, including ‘local communal life’, can be estab-
lished in the modern ‘machine age’, Dewey argued, then ‘it will mani-
fest a fullness, variety and freedom of possession and enjoyment of
meanings and goods unknown in the contiguous associations of the
past’. It will be ‘alive and flexible as well as stable, responsive to the
complex and world-wide scene in which it is enmeshed’ (Dewey :
). In contrast to Habermas’ pessimistic view of modern social forms,
Dewey emphasizes modernity’s potential. ‘The observation that the
interests of the community are better cared for when there is permitted a
large measure of personal judgment and choice in the formation of
intellectual conclusions, is an observation which could hardly have been
made until social mobility and heterogeneity had brought about initia-
tion and invention in technological matters and industry, and until
secular pursuits had become formidable rivals to church and state’
(Dewey : ).
Dewey’s formulation of the public is more open and flexible than that
of Habermas and thus can be applied to more historical contexts.
Habermas himself has cautiously and indirectly recognized the value of
Dewey’s non-Kantian approach (Habermas : ). Dewey high-
lights the features of ‘modern’ society—for Dewey, the ‘machine age’ of
the s—that distinguish it from earlier eras. At the same time, Dewey
eschews the attribution of public to merely one type of society or his-
torical era. He emphasizes the vast number of practices, habits and re-
sponsive adjustments to different situations that contribute to shaping a
sense of public based on overlapping interests.
The development of mass higher education in Muslim majority
societies since mid-century (Eickelman ) and, more recently,
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increasingly accessible forms of communication and new media have
played a significant role in fragmenting and contesting political and
religious authority (Eickelman and Anderson : -). But these
recent developments did not call a public sphere into being. Instead,
they contributed significantly to reshaping a sense and structure of
public that was already available. The intensified fragmentation of reli-
gious and political authority characteristic of the modern era does not
lead inevitably to democracy or ‘civil society’, but the transparency that
recent developments—including rapid communications by telephone,
fax, internet, and a greater ease in travel—make possible obliges even the
most authoritarian of regimes to justify their actions. It also increases
the scope, intensity, and forms of involvement in a multiplicity of over-
lapping public spheres. Human rights organizations, NGOs, women’s
rights groups, and religious organizations, among others, can operate
more quickly and independently across national and regional boundaries
in modern conditions. Actors in a repressive ‘homeland’ public sphere
can also enter more readily into contact with their ‘diaspora’ counter-
parts, often living in circumstances less subject to political control and
intimidation.
The increased possibilities for transnational communication also
contribute significantly to widening ‘homeland’ public spheres. Some
ideas of public can be intensely local; others can be transregional and
transnational, expressing multiple ideas of group and community. Par-
ticipation in the contemporary public sphere implies an openness and at
least implicit pluralism in the sense of a capacity to act—or at least
express beliefs—independently from state or ruling authorities.
Islam in the public sphere: linking past and present
The significance of informal ties in creating a vital public sphere
becomes more salient when we focus on accepted and socially legitimat-
ed means of accomplishing a task, rather than just on formal institu-
tions authorized or acknowledged by some authority or ruler. These
background clusters of concepts, shared understandings, and practices
underpin the public sphere in any historical era (Taylor : ).
Guilds of merchants and craftsmen, although recognized by the Otto-
man administration, operated in an autonomous manner, punishing
infractions by their members, defining acceptable practice, and settling
disputes. Pious foundations (awqaf) enjoyed a similar autonomy.
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Due to their informal organizational character, Sufi orders, or reli-
gious brotherhoods offer an excellent locus for understanding historical
shifts in the public sphere in Muslim majority societies. In recent cen-
turies these developments have become increasingly entangled with
European ones, although they do not necessarily follow the same tra-
jectory.
Although informal, the ties between master and disciple in Sufism
have a substance and concreteness as significant as such formal and
legally recognized institutions as guilds, pious endowments (waqfs) and
mosque-universities (madrasas). Acknowledging the change in political
forms over time, anthropologist Abdellah Hammoudi () argues that
the master-student tie in Sufism serves as the key metaphor and practice
by which authority is legitimated throughout the Arab world in general,
and Morocco in particular, notwithstanding the formal trappings of
parliamentary and other representative institutions since independence.
Hammoudi’s argument can be criticized for imputing to earlier his-
torical contexts the social relationships of later periods. However, other
historians show how many Sufi orders shifted in the eighteenth century
toward more formal and hierarchical organization. This shift allowed
some orders to serve as vehicles for social and political change (Levtzion
). In some cases the authority of the shaykh expanded beyond the
narrow range of both the madrasa and the tariqa (brotherhood) and
became a vehicle for internalizing Islamic norms in the wider society.
Dealing with the early nineteenth century Sudan, Hofheinz (-)
has pointed out how religious specialists with a high degree of formal
schooling worked to spread the norms of scriptural Islam among the
illiterate population of smaller towns and the countryside, as opposed to
forming a more aloof scholarly or mystical elite. In a manner comparable
to the Pietistic missions in the countryside in central and northern
Europe, these movements inculcated the know-how needed to adapt
emotionally and structurally to the wider socio-political transformations
taking place as part of incorporation into the colonial system and the
slow formation of nation-states. These transformations are what Elias
called the ‘civilizing process’. They consisted of the formation among
wide sectors of the population of more or less uniform norms that help-
ed anticipate the consequence of one’s behavior in wider society, and
therefore created a sense of public interest.
In a similar vein, Sufi leaders and orders in Algeria, long discredited
because of their reputation for compromise with French colonial
authorities, reemerged in the s together with Islamic associations as
a backbone for collective action independent from both Islamic extrem-
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ists and the state (Rouadjia : , , , ; Andezian : -,
-). As in the example of the Sudan in the nineteenth century,
Sufism offered a template—as did other forms of religious
association—for developing norms and expectations that encompassed
social life in general and not just that of the religious order alone.
The common element between Sufi organizations in earlier eras and
in the present is the tenacity of the master-disciple relationship and its
potential for legitimating various forms of religious and political
authority. Sufi orders reached out to a variety of constituencies, using
not only madrasa Arabic but also its colloquial counterparts and the
vernacular languages of different regions. Ruling authorities were often
deeply suspicious of the orders because of their autonomy and capacity
for independent action, linking the local with much wider spheres of
influence. In fifteenth century Morocco, for example, saints or ‘pious
ones’ (salihun) manifested not only a closeness to the Divine presence
(walaya) but also exercised worldly authority (wilaya) (Cornell ).
Saints embodied a just moral order. Both in practice (for living saints
were prominent in North Africa as elsewhere) and as cultural meta-
phors, saints set limits to the abuse of authority and contributed to the
creation of Morocco’s political order.
More generally, the innovative Sufi movements of the seventeenth,
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in many parts of the Muslim world,
from the Maghrib to South and Southeast Asia, interpreted texts and
practices far beyond the narrower compass offered by scripture—and
law-based religious scholarship. Sufi practices in this period increasingly
favored understandings that were less oriented to the esoteric and mys-
tical than to inculcating collective understandings and shared practices
that could cut across lines of occupation, wealth, lineage and region.
These notions were still ambiguously poised between the disciplines of
mystical self-denial and a more socially oriented disciplined participa-
tion in society (Gran : -; Salvatore : -). Still, these
shared habits and practices contributed significantly to developing Islam
as a principle of the social order.
Sufi ‘revivalism’ in the last three centuries paved the way for a new
conception of Islamically legitimated action in public life by implicitly
developing the idea of the social Muslim. Sufism asserted the right of
individual believers to experiment with the ‘truth’ independent of the
shari‘a, or accepted practice and the conventions of legal scholarship.
Sufi orders, often interconnected over large distances, were usually not
directly political but offered a template for intervention in society inde-
pendent from both the state and from local affinities such as tribe, vil-
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lage or region (Reichmuth ). These orders often offered a secure
social role and engendered a strong sense of interdependence. Several
revivalist movements in North and West Africa even led to the founda-
tion of new forms of political domination, including Sufi and Mahdist
movements in Cyrenaica, Sudan, and Nigeria (Keddie ; Reichmuth
). These movements became increasingly active in politics—
sometimes within major centers of learning and sometimes challenging
the established order. The neo-Sufi movements often grew in response
to European political and economic domination, but responded equally
to local developments.
Parallel to the emerging sense of social Islam engendered through
Sufi orders by the eighteenth century, religious scholars and the general
public alike increasingly began to see the shari‘a as more than a special-
ized juridical-theological notion. The spread of printing, in particular,
accelerated the standardization of texts (Robinson ). It also encour-
aged making the shari‘a a popular trope rather than just a jurist’s notion,
encompassing the explicit and implicit, taken-for-granted rules, habits
and practices needed to live a good life as a Muslim. In Egypt, for
example, by the late nineteenth century the concept of shari‘a took on a
new meaning as a template for reasonable, just and expected social
practice—in short, social normativity. In this sense, it acquired a mean-
ing distinct from the concrete law applied by the courts and from the
science of jurisprudence (fiqh) charged with making sense of it (Salva-
tore ). This discourse was illustrated and propagated by the rise of a
print culture that increasingly incorporated issues of economic prosper-
ity and its associated social and moral requirements into the public vir-
tues of faith (Gasper ).
The emerging public sphere in Muslim majority societies
Even in societies where religious expression and practice are strongly
regulated or circumscribed in the public sphere, such as constitutionally
secular Turkey and Ba‘thist Syria, they serve as an important element of
the background understandings for most members of society. Adapting
such understandings to current social practice, Egypt’s Muslim Brother-
hood movement (al-ikhwan al-muslimun) emerged in thes to become
what many observers still consider as the only genuinely popular
mass political movement in twentieth-century Egypt, reaching its hey-
day after the Israeli defeat of the combined Arab states in . Royalist
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Egypt allegedly saw the movement as a sufficiently serious political
threat to organize the assassination of its leader, Hasan al-Banna’, in
. Two years after the  Egyptian revolution, Nasser ruthlessly
suppressed the movement for the same reason. Again in , the
Egyptian state is indicting the movement as a threat to state security in
spite of prior tacit approval for some of its key figures to participate in
parliament.
The proliferating efforts of thinkers, associations and social move-
ments trying to discern how to lead a good ‘Muslim’ life under modern
conditions have been particularly vigorous since the late s. This is
when movements like Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood tried to make Islam
fit the requirements of social development under the conditions of
modern nation-state building. More recently, the crisis of secular
nationalism since the late s and the s has created favorable
conditions for a religiously oriented reflection and mobilization that
integrates individual salvation and self-realization with a commitment to
community welfare. Of course, as indicated earlier, rising levels of edu-
cation, the proliferation of ready forms of communication, and greater
ease of travel have accelerated this process. Not only new communica-
tive technologies, but also new uses of such humble elements of local
communication as the telephone to enable women to participate in
political and social movements, as in Istanbul (White ), have facili-
tated broader participation in community activities.
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was well organized for gaining
popular support in an earlier era and served as a model for similar
movements elsewhere. It retains a strong hold in Egypt. However,
popular political and religious movements of more recent origin, includ-
ing Lebanon’s Hizbullah, Palestine’s Hamas, and—for the sake of a
non-Islamic comparison—Israel’s Shas have adapted themselves to play
a role in their respective public spheres. It is easy to think of such
movements primarily in terms of their political influence. At their base,
however, they appeal to their respective constituencies through their
implicit and explicit invocation of shared moral understandings of social
action. In the case of the two Arab groups, the social base includes a
primary commitment to social work or action (al-iltizam bi-l-‘amal
al-ijtima‘i). Morally- and religiously-inspired social action underlies
the building of networks that provide assistance to the needy, basic
health care and education—services that the state often cannot effi-
ciently provide. Such social action can be informally organized, based on
affinities of shared habits, expectations, practices and interests. It can
also coalesce around formal institutions and associations. Such move-
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ments can also provide non-state forms of arbitration and justice, media
representations, and formulate blueprints for the entire national polity
(see Deeb, forthcoming). These associations provide dependable person-
al ties to cut through poorly understood bureaucratic regulations and
indifferent bureaucracies. Religiously based charitable associations,
focusing on a wide array of services (medical, educational, family wel-
fare and emergency assistance), play exactly such a role. They build
initially on ties of local trust (Benthall : -) and community,
although they can also provide a base for subsequent political partici-
pation.
Such forms of religiously motivated charitable and service associa-
tion involve an intricate web of informational and expressive transac-
tions (McQuail : ). They remind us that the public sphere is
composed of more than agents who actively participate in specific in-
stitutions or associations, although the existence of such associations is
an important element of the public sphere. Other groups lack formal
organization and are clustered more by affinity. This is the case for the
groups and activities associated with Fethullah Gülen in Turkey, for
example. They lack central organization and coordination—an asset
when elements of the state become repressive and seek to seize assets
and people—but their component associations and groups share a com-
mon moral orientation to action within society and polity.
An indicator of the dynamic, underlying values on which such
informal and formal activities are based is the proliferation of what has
been called the ‘Islamic book’, a style of writing that appeals to new
audiences. These are inexpensive, attractively printed mass-market texts
that address such practical questions as how to live as a Muslim in the
modern world and the perils of neglecting Islamic obligations. Some
offer advice to young women on how to live as a Muslim in modern
urban society, and some take the form of popular catechisms. These
books articulate basic questions bearing directly on the lives of average
citizens. For example, do Islamic traditions and practices—subject to
deep and traumatic strains and transformations, especially since the
colonial era—still offer sure guidelines for how to conduct one’s life,
educate one’s children, and participate in community affairs, mosque,
nation, and community of Muslims worldwide? If not, how can such
traditions or practices be restored or adapted to current practice?
Such ‘Islamic books’ break with the cadences of traditional literary
Arabic (and with parallel traditions in other languages widely used by
Muslims, including Bengla, Urdu, English and French) and instead are
often written in a breezy, colloquial style. They are often sold on
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sidewalks and outside mosques, and since the s have eclipsed other
types of books in the market (Gonzalez-Quijano : -). The
more conventional sort of ‘grand’ intellectual discourse continues, but is
often confined to narrow intellectual circles (Salvatore : -).
Equally pervasive are audio and video cassettes, and popular preachers
who have mastered the new media. Some of the more successful, such as
Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, combine multiple media—personal appear-
ances, books (often based on the spoken word), pamphlets, audio and
video cassettes, radio, television, satellite television and Internet—to
reach a variety of audiences.
The public sphere as ‘shared anticipation’
The transformations associated with the rise of modern nation-
states, bureaucracies and capitalist sectors within societies are related to
a phenomenon that can be termed an ‘education into anticipation’. This
notion builds on Norbert Elias’ ( []) concept of the ‘civilizing
process’ and overlaps with the notion of habitus as ‘a matrix of percep-
tions, appreciations, and actions’, a ‘generative principle of regulated
improvisations that makes possible the achievement of infinitely diverse
tasks’ (Bourdieu : , ). However, the notion of habitus
downplays the importance of the ‘externalities’ of discourse in setting
rules of communication and interaction (Calhoun : -). Dewey
offers a more comprehensive approach, arguing that shared habits
and practice, mediated by discourse accepted as authoritative, allow a
community to build up a sense of expectation about others. Gellner
() discusses how the modern state inculcates the habits of the citi-
zen and shapes common identities—through shared experiences such as
military conscription, schooling with a common curriculum, and taxa-
tion. The public can be thought of as the orchestrated realm of the
permissible.
Equally important are common forms of resistance to the state. Thus
Iranian villagers, faced with the disruptions of the Shah’s White Revo-
lution, developed shared practices to deflect or indirectly defeat state
intervention in their affairs (Goodell ). Iranian youth born since the
- revolution are also beginning to participate in a ‘post-
Islamic’ public space in which they increasingly ignore regime restric-
tions on dress, leisure activities, relations between the sexes, and other
aspects of life (Khosrokhavar and Roy : -). Throughout the
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Muslim-majority world, as elsewhere, students learn not only the formal
elements of the curriculum in school, but also the hidden lessons of
bureaucratic indifference, hierarchy, class, ethnicity and gender identity.
In the diverse, rapidly changing conditions of modern society, the state
cannot provide guidance from above to shape all activities. More com-
plex ways of inculcating and negotiating background understandings
are needed to provide the ‘connecting tissue’ of information, expression,
and solidarity.
In drawing attention to the communicative and interconnected
aspects of social life that we call the public sphere, Dewey shows how
acts become public when their consequences, even if initiated in private,
indirectly affect the welfare of many others (Dewey : ). For this
reason, the state or the community also acts to regulate or to limit certain
actions of individuals if these actions threaten the community. The
public entails an awareness among members of a society that discrete
acts have a general impact on others. Hence the sense of public is the
means through which this perception of the consequences of actions is
generalized. People are ‘educated’ into this perception, anticipating the
consequences of one another’s actions. This is the point at which
Dewey’s notion of the public and Elias’ notion of the ‘civilizing pro-
cess’—despite their divergent theoretical concerns—converge. Shared
anticipation is the condition of possibility of a public sphere.
The emergence of the public coincides here with the opening up of
the circles of reciprocity and mutual obligations, which also allows for
the crystallization of a notion of social welfare and general interest. The
consolidated effect of the socialization that allows people to anticipate
the consequences of their actions can also be called ‘moral agency’, a
broader notion than citizenship.
Of course, media-mediated, mass forms of communication that are
not face-to-face are also crucial to the modern public sphere. Schooling
and television broadcasts (including interview programs and soap op-
eras) contribute to developing a collective sense of anticipation and
internalization of norms. These patterns of anticipation are crucial to
debates on common interest, but they are not the whole story. Liberal
political theory, as exemplified by Kant and Habermas, assumes that
contributors to the public sphere are engaged in basically free exchanges
of opinions unrestricted by considerations of status or authority.
Dewey’s approach requires no such idealism. For him, the public sphere
is at once more dynamic—and more fragile. Speakers and their audi-
ences take a variety of background information into account and engage
in a great deal of miscommunication and misapprehension.
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In the context of modern, complex societies, shared standards of
anticipation must still be based on ties that are perceived as local, even if
these ‘localities’—taking advantage of modern communications—are
not local in a geographical sense. Even for the s, Dewey (: )
called for a restoration of ‘local communal life’, a task perhaps techni-
cally easier today than in earlier eras. The public spheres of contempo-
rary societies and polities are made up of highly diverse groups. They all
possess a strong sense of local knowledge, but not always the same local
knowledge, although they significantly overlap. Modern public spheres
are constituted through a frail, overlapping consensus based on shared
mechanisms of anticipation. In the Turkish case, for example, national-
ists may say that loyalty to the nation transcends all other identities. Yet,
as Bellér-Hann and Hann (: ) explain, many other identities
emerge from the ‘continuous flow of social interaction’. National iden-
tity combines with ‘identities of a more traditional sort, such as those
linked to language, gender, family and religion, and with newer identi-
ties that people create in increasingly globalised marketplaces’. Moral
agency does not necessarily operate with the same intensity or in the
same way in all shared circles of consensus. For example, a media cam-
paign to raise funds for relief work in Bosnia or Palestine, or to provide
meat for the poor on Muslim feast days, entails different dimensions
from a movement based primarily in a single locality.
Of the multiple modern public spheres, the nation-state claims pri-
macy, prescribing models of homogeneous identity-formation and ritual
constitution for the whole community. One key ritual, even in authori-
tarian states, is general elections. The complexity of social life, the
modularity of identities, and the contest over primacy shows in the
existence of ‘warm’ circles of community and obligation. Warm circles
are trusting, familiar and open-ended. They demand loyalty and imply
reciprocity. ‘Cold’ circles of community—those that are formal, distant
and single-stranded—also make claims to loyalty and primacy, but in
practice they are relegated to secondary importance or are ignored.
What is distinctive about the modern public sphere is the rapidity with
which cold circles of community can sometimes merge with warm ones,
creating novel senses of community. Scheff (: ) argues that there
has been a paucity of systematic studies of bonds of communal solidar-
ity, with the result that Durkheim’s distinction between mechanical and
organic solidarity—or for that matter the distinction between commu-
nity and society—deflects attention away from the possibility that these
two types of solidarity are often interwoven. The notion we develop here
of shared social anticipations parallels Thomas Scheff’s (: -)
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development of the notion of abduction, a concept derived from philo-
sopher Charles Peirce (-). This is the process of shuttling back
and forth between observation and imagination ‘which enables partici-
pants to accomplish the incredibly complex process of understanding
meanings in context’. Moreover, such understandings involve both
emotional and intellectual attunement among participants in solidarity
groups, maintaining social ties and bonds of identity and building trust
through the ‘reciprocal ratification’ of feelings and actions (Scheff :
-).
Inculcated and shared standards of anticipation, generated and trans-
formed through habit and practice, are often conceived of in terms of
a stable ‘tradition’ (Elias : ). In this form, they establish the cohe-
siveness of norms in modern societies. The reproduction and trans-
mission of these norms always requires an endless capacity for creative
adaptation. Nicolas Haddad, a major Egyptian reformer and ‘proto-
sociologist’ of early twentieth century Egypt, reformulated the tradition
of adab (‘manners’) in terms of acquisition of the skills necessary for
‘social commerce’—a notion that resonates with Elias’ underlying idea
of the civilizing process. Haddad maintained that, ‘unlike other species,
man’s struggle for survival is associated specifically with two ideas: life
expectancy (al-ajal al-madid) and quality of life (al-hazz al-sa‘id, liter-
ally, ‘good luck’)’. These two ideas come together in the concept of the
future (al-mustaqbal)’ (Farag : ). This new sociology—paralle-
led for the Turkish context by Ziya Gökalp and for the Iranian context
by Ahmad Kasravi (Parsi : -)—was also a new program of
education. Haddad’s examples of how normativity works—through
teaching anticipation—evokes Gellner’s () conception of building a
‘modular self’, a modern sense of responsible agency based on a distinc-
tion between differentfields of social action and action within thesefields.
The way a sense of public is built into social interactions varies
considerably with social context and notions of personality, responsibil-
ity and justice inherited from older traditions. In the context of the
contemporary nation-state, modern techniques of authority, persuasion
and control must be taken into account. These may limit the construc-
tion of a genuinely ‘modular’ self. State techniques such as military
conscription, policing practices, the perceived pervasiveness of inform-
ers, and modern schooling dramatically influence the sense of shared
anticipations. In repressive regimes, this is done through persuading the
public of the omnipresence of informers.
Less sinister forms of social control also abound. Discussion may
often be ‘channeled’, so that the major media (radio, television and mass
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circulation newspapers) are carefully regulated in what is said and not
said, while the ‘little’ media, such as books and magazines of more
limited circulation, are given considerably more latitude for expression.
Modern censors and state authorities often allow some open forums for
discussion, knowing that these media fail effectively to reach the major-
ity of the audience (Eickelman : ). Moreover, not only the state,
but private organizations and interest groups, seek to regulate and
control their presentation of self in the public sphere (Jackall and Hirota
).
There are many forms of state, as Dewey says, but in most societies
the modern state, whether authoritarian or liberal, is strong and perva-
sive, and there are continuing debates about the proper limits to state
authority. The modern state says that it exercises censorship for the good
of its citizens, and polices society for the same reason. The state,
whether in Muslim-majority societies or in Europe, sets the stage
and the rules of conduct. On the other hand, the state may be
increasingly challenged or criticized. Such criticism may not always be
effective and it may sometimes be dangerous, but most state authorities
are increasingly aware that their current secrets or indiscretions, and
those of the past, may be the subject of public commentary and dis-
cussion.
The existence of a modern nation-state, however, does not inevitably
lead to an open public sphere in which the discipline of shared antici-
pations (only part of which emanates from the state) and the possibility
of deliberation on public matters emerge together. For this to occur,
other social actors are needed who have some degree of autonomy, who
are not instruments of the state (although detractors may impute this
role to them), and who communicate through available and effective
forums and communications media. The mix of resources will vary. In
Syria, it may be the salons of established businessmen and intellectuals,
gatherings known to state authorities but tolerated because they are not
mentioned in formal media (Al-Azm ). Other venues include the
new media, audio and videocassettes, photocopied leaflets, as well coffee
shops, mosques and church congregations. They may also include secret
or ‘non declared’ associations. Just as secret lodges were important for
the Enlightenment movement in Europe, organizations not formally
declared to the state or reported to it often acquire a major significance.
Sometimes the same people are involved in both kinds of activities. This
was as much the case for French philosophes such as Denis Diderot and
Muslim reformers such as Muhammad ‘Abduh. In the end, however,
not all authority ends up being absorbed into the public sphere. There is
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a constant tension between state and society over the space allowed for
the public sphere.
Solidarity and circles of communication in the modern public sphere
Communications within ‘warm’ circles and the creation of public
circuits of communication in wider, ‘cold’ public spheres do not mark
two different social types of public. They are crosscurrents within the
same societies and the same or overlapping public spheres. Consider, for
example, Egyptian Islamic intellectual and media star Mustafa Mahmud
(born ). His career, especially after he became identified with Islam-
ic thought and practice, shows how expressive and informational
transactions are linked to social solidarity in the public sphere (Salvatore
). Mahmud’s particular role in the Egyptian public sphere has been
to articulate the scholarly discourse of ulama with the needs and prac-
tices of wider groups, contributing to a ‘re-intellectualization’ of Islam
in an accessible vernacular form. Before becoming an Islamic intellec-
tual in the s, he was a secularist. Following vigorous protests from
some religious figures, state authority confiscated his book Allah wa-l-
insan (‘God and man’) inon the allegation that it spread atheistic and
impious thoughts. By his account, he then began a journey in the search
of truth that brought him ‘from doubt to faith’ (min al-shakk ila-l-iman),
the title of one of his later best-sellers. He began his ‘Islamic’ career in
the late s with the publication of a Quranic commentary (tafsir). Its
popularity was due to the inclusion of both the vocabulary of the natural
sciences (Mahmud was a medical doctor) and the vernacular of everyday
experience. This blend of religion, science and common sense—and
showing the consistency among them—proved a winning formula.
His public liked him because he helped them to identify Islam
(against a wall of doubt elaborated by poorly understood but respected
modern science) as a blueprint for social responsibility that transcended
material and individual interests. By the early s, Mahmud built up a
successful television series, ‘Science and Faith’ (al-‘ilm wa-l-iman),
founded his own mosque, and created a charitable medical association.
These actions legitimized his public discourse because the public—
primarily Egyptians, but also Palestinians and Jordanians—knew that it
was accompanied by concrete social acts.
Mahmud’s rapid rise in popularity did not represent the ascendancy
of ‘lay’ religious authority over that of the ulama. His ascent and the
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crucial support he received from the Shaykh al-Azhar of the time,
‘Abd-al-Halim Mahmud, shows how much he still depended on an
implicit association with traditional ulama. Nor did the Egyptian public
see his style of media authority as radically alternative to that of the
leading television preacher of the time, Shaykh Muhammad Mutawalli
Sha‘rawi (d. ). Mahmud’s audience sees these two ‘stars’ as different
in style but reinforcing one other. In Mahmud’s heyday in the s and
early s, his public also listened to him in a different way to that of an
earlier era. In an earlier period, Nasser spoke to audiences. Mahmud
spoke with them. Families gathered in their living room to watch his
program, so that he shared their domestic space. Invoking the master-
disciple relationship of Sufism, people who knew him only through
television referred to him as ‘their’ shaykh, a claim made more vivid by
knowledge of his charitable works. In his clinics, some patients expected
to be treated by him (although he ceased practising medicine decades
earlier) rather than by the regular clinic staff. Whereas public figures
such Muhammad Shahrur and Sa‘id Ramadan al-Buti of Syria re-
present opposing types with incompatible views, Sha‘rawi and Mustafa
Mahmud make more of a double billing of complementary personalities
in Egypt.
The ability of some actors and messages to transform the ‘cold’
sphere into a ‘warm’ one, as Mustafa Mahmud successfully did, is char-
acteristic of the modern era. This transformative ability is rapidly
being accelerated by new interactive media such as the Internet and
satellite television—often freed from many conventional state restric-
tions. The result is an intensified cross-cutting of messages. There has
long been a de facto pluralism in the Muslim majority world, although
sometimes masked by some groups and leaders asserting their lead-
ership over the umma, the worldwide community of Muslims. Inten-
sified communications have resulted in a sort of horizontal transnation-
alism of nonstate actors. This may be expressed in a concern for Muslim
minorities, the boundaries of accommodation to non-Muslim majori-
ties, and the permeability of the frontiers of Muslim thought and prac-
tice. The cross-cutting includes ‘Western’ and ‘Muslim’ circles of
communication. The two circles often overlap and are mutually sup-
portive. Debates over ‘being Muslim’ can be intensely local or follow
lines of language. They can also be regional or even global, as in a
Kuwaiti newspaper debate over whether women should participate in
the  Beijing World Conference on women (Shahrur ). In these
discussions and practices, ‘being Muslim’ is never an exclusive identity,
for one also has identities of family, language, nation, region, gender and
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others that make identities situational and which also require pragmatic
compromise and accommodation.
In modern societies, including authoritarian ones, there are other
actors besides the state. For example, engaged Muslims who have the
means to do so use media as well as the ability to support collective
projects for the public good, creating vehicles for teaching others in
words and in deeds how to be a good Muslim. This consciousness of
media power and the partial accessibility of some media even in authori-
tarian sociopolitical contexts also provides alternatives to thinking of
Islamic action in immediate political terms. It can equally mean contrib-
uting to the construction of an Islamically informed public as a more
realistic goal than the establishment of a local or worldwide Islamic state
(Yasin:-). This option also corresponds to a Dewey-like gradu-
alistic view (in Arabic, tadarrujan), which is also a pragmatic means of
accommodating to authoritarian states or militant secularism.
Conclusion: whither modularity?
Modern identities are basically modular, as Gellner () and others
assert. They are often inculcated through formal education and state
practices, but they always have to be socially sustained and are subject to
change over time. Modularity is never self-sufficient and self-sustaining.
There are cultural differences in how a public reason is distilled and
legitimized out of these overlapping ‘ties that bind’ and how they inter-
act with the ‘firmest tie’, as Islam is called in the Quran (: ; : ).
On the other hand, in seeking to understand the link between the public
sphere and Muslim identities, we see more than a politics of ‘identity’,
of almost optional affinities, as is the case in the entitlement politics of
certain US and European contexts. A contemporary Islamic public
encompasses the publishing business (magazines, books, audiocassettes
and their networks of distribution), reading groups, relief associations,
solidarity networks and political movements, and—of particular
significance—the mosque and the collective Friday prayer and sermon.
These media and sites combine in a multitude of ways. This Muslim
public is grounded in practices that emerge through the complex process
of ingraining of Muslim traditions into modern social life. Based on a
study of efforts in independent Pakistan to implement Islamic law
(shari‘a), Masud () indicates how this supposedly fixed tradition,
like modernity itself, is a process of discourse and practice, not fixed in
content other than the ideological claim that it is fixed.
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Culture, however, must not be understood in the older sense of fixed
and static practices but as contested, loosely bounded and emerging.
Eisenstadt’s () notion of ‘multiple modernities’ is one way of
accounting for these different trajectories and relating them to the idea
of the public sphere.
One reason for the importance of seeing continuities between the
public spheres of the past and the present is to foreground the element
of shared standards of anticipation that make public spheres—and in
some cases, democracy—work. This essay suggests some points of
departure for understanding a variety of historical trajectories and back-
ground cultural understandings that can shape public spheres. It also
suggests ways of accommodating some of the European-centered main
currents of social thought to the vital way in which religious belief and
practice continues to play a dynamic, and often constructive, role in
shaping the modern public sphere.
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